Smith ScholarWorks
Economics: Faculty Publications

Economics

1-1-2011

Inflation Targeting and Relative Price Variability: What Difference
Does Inflation Targeting Make?
Chi Young Choi
The University of Texas at Arlington

Young Se Kim
Sungkyunkwan University

Róisín O'Sullivan
Smith College, rosulliv@smith.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.smith.edu/eco_facpubs
Part of the Economics Commons

Recommended Citation
Choi, Chi Young; Kim, Young Se; and O'Sullivan, Róisín, "Inflation Targeting and Relative Price Variability:
What Difference Does Inflation Targeting Make?" (2011). Economics: Faculty Publications, Smith College,
Northampton, MA.
https://scholarworks.smith.edu/eco_facpubs/61

This Article has been accepted for inclusion in Economics: Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of
Smith ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact scholarworks@smith.edu

Inflation Targeting and Relative Price Variability:
What Diﬀerence Does Inflation Targeting Make?∗
Chi-Young Choi†

Young Se Kim‡

Róisín O’Sullivan§

June 28, 2010

JEL Classification Numbers: E31,E52,E58

∗

The authors are grateful to co-editor Kent Kimbrough and two anonymous referees for constructive comments
that helped to improve the paper. The authors also wish to thank Steve Cecchetti, Kang Liu, Shin-Ichi Nishiyama,
Margie Tieslau, Taka Tsuruga, and the seminar participants at the Academia Sinica, National Chung Cheng University,
National Sun Yat-Sen University, National Taiwan University, the Texas Tech University, and University of Texas at
Arlington, for helpful comments and Vikas Kakkar for providing CPI data for Hong Kong. Any remaining errors are
the authors’.
†
Department of Economics, University of Texas at Arlington, Arlington, TX 76019, USA; E-mail: cychoi@uta.edu;
Corresponding author.
‡
Department of Economics, University of North Texas, Denton, TX 76203, USA.
§
Department of Economics, Smith College, Northampton, MA 01063, USA.

1

Abstract

This paper studies the eﬀects of inflation targeting (IT) on relative price variability (RPV) using
a data set of 20 countries comprising both targeters and nontargeters. We find that a decline in mean
inflation after IT adoption is not necessarily associated with a similar fall in RPV, and that what
matters most for the structural changes in RPV is the initial inflation regime prior to the adoption
of IT rather than IT adoption itself. IT adoption impacts the shape of the underlying relationship
between inflation and RPV in countries with initially high inflation rates, moving it from monotonic
to the U-shaped profile observed for countries with low inflation regimes. The minimum point of this
U-shape curve is indicative of the public’s expectations of inflation and is very close to the announced
target for inflation in most of the countries we study.
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Introduction

Variability in relative prices is known to be a major channel through which inflation can induce welfare
costs by impeding an eﬃcient allocation of resources in the economy. Consequently, substantial eﬀort
has been devoted in the literature to examining the link between relative price variability (RPV) and
aggregate inflation. Although much of the existing theoretical and empirical literature points to a
positive monotonic relationship, newer contributions suggest that the relationship between inflation
and RPV is more complicated, particularly in terms of its sensitivity to the inflation regime.1
The primary purpose of this study is to investigate whether the connection between inflation
and RPV is influenced in an important way by the monetary policy framework chosen by a central
bank. Specifically, this paper focuses on exploring whether the adoption of an inflation targeting (IT)
framework exerts any significant impact on RPV, as measured by the standard deviations of sectoral
inflation rates relative to the aggregate rate. Since it was first implemented in New Zealand over
two decades ago, the popularity of IT has spread, with some 25 countries worldwide implementing
the framework to date (Freedman and Laxton 2009). The literature is now replete with studies
pointing to reductions in both the level and the volatility of inflation in countries that have adopted
IT [e.g. Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel 2007].2 While studies of the impact of IT on aggregate inflation
performance are plentiful, little attention has been paid to the impact of IT on RPV.
The question of whether and indeed how IT aﬀects RPV is an important one for several reasons.
First, exploring the potential connection between IT and RPV is a worthwhile exercise given the
popularity of IT as a monetary framework and the centrality of RPV to the current generation of
macro models. The importance of RPV is recognized in standard New Keynesian DSGE models,
where the variance of relative prices is viewed as a useful summary statistic. As noted by Amano,
Ambler, and Rebei (2007), for example, in DSGE models, the optimal rate of target inflation and the
optimal variability of inflation relative to output depend on the quantitative eﬀects of price dispersion
on macroeconomic equilibrium. Second, answering the question helps us to identify the driving force
behind the change in RPV, distinguishing between IT adoption itself and its subsequent impact on
inflation. If the relationship is monotonically positive as is often believed in the literature, one should
expect that IT adoption would bring about a decline in RPV in the same way as it has led to a decline
in inflation. If the relationship is more complex, however, the eﬀect of IT adoption on reducing RPV
may hinge upon the change in inflation regimes after IT adoption. Third, our answer to the question
also sheds additional light on the empirical evidence for the relative eﬀectiveness of IT across diﬀerent
stages of development. While there is strong evidence that developing countries benefit more from

1

IT than industrial countries in combating inflation and its volatility [e.g. Pétursson 2004; Lin and
Ye 2009], we are aware of no empirical research that has assessed this issue with respect to RPV.
To address the question, we consider a data set of 20 industrial and developing countries consisting
of twelve targeters and eight nontargeters during the so-called great moderation period starting in
the mid-1980s. We first find that IT adoption brings about a downward shift in mean inflation in all
countries under study, consistent with the literature. The more interesting findings relate to the link
between IT adoption and RPV. For countries with initially high inflation rates3 , we find that a fall in
mean inflation is associated with a similar decline in RPV after the adoption of IT. In countries with
initially low inflation rates, however, RPV changed little, and even increased after IT adoption. This
result, as in the recent findings by Choi (2010) and Choi and Kim (2010), suggests that the nature
of the connection between inflation and RPV is not monotonic but instead hinges upon inflation
regimes, with a linear positive relationship at high trend inflation and a U-shaped relationship in
low or moderate inflation environments.4 A similar story is evident for non-targeting countries, with
RPV falling with mean inflation only in the high inflation countries. Combined together, it seems
that what matters most for the structural changes in RPV is not the adoption of IT per se but the
initial inflation environments prior to adopting IT.
Once the structural shift in inflation is taken into account, our regression analysis based on a range
of econometric techniques, including semi-parametric regression, parametric regression, and rolling
regression, suggests that IT adoption has brought about a tighter connection between inflation and
RPV. Put diﬀerently, the same shocks to inflation lead to a larger dispersion of relative prices under
IT, probably because a stronger commitment to a numerical target for inflation results in a higher
degree of nominal rigidity via the sluggish response of inflation expectations. Prices might also have
become more rigid after IT adoption due to a fall in average inflation, consistent with the ample
empirical evidence on the inverse relationship between the degree of price rigidity and the inflation
regime [e.g. Kiley 2000; Nakamura and Steinsson 2008]. If firms set their prices more flexibly in
high inflation settings, while maintaining stickier prices in low inflation environments, an increase in
the degree of price rigidity could be associated with a larger dispersion of relative prices [e.g. Ball,
Mankiw, and Reis 2005]. Since the tighter link between inflation and RPV is also observed in most
nontargeters, however, the increased rigidity in price adjustment is posited to be driven more by the
fall in mean inflation than by the change in the monetary policy framework itself.
We also find that the underlying relationship between inflation and RPV takes a U-shaped profile
in most cases under study, in line with the recent findings by Choi (2010) and Fielding and Mizen
(2008). While the U-shaped profile is found in low inflation countries regardless of IT adoption,
2

it is observed in high inflation targeters only after IT adoption. However, no such shift to a Ushaped relationship is observed in the high-inflation nontargeters under study, suggesting that IT
makes a major diﬀerence in high inflation countries but not in low inflation countries. The U-shaped
relationship implies the presence of a point at which RPV is minimized, which we denote as π ∗
throughout the paper. According to our empirical results, π ∗ is positive and significantly diﬀerent
from zero in most countries, indicating that the inflation-RPV relationship is U-shaped around a
positive inflation rate. RPV, therefore, changes not with the inflation rate per se as widely believed
in the literature, but with the deviation of the inflation rate from π ∗ in either direction. In this
context, π ∗ is conceptually related to the central bank’s numerical target for inflation [e.g. Ireland
2007] or the inflation target level perceived by the public [e.g. Kozicki and Tinsley 2005]. Given that
IT purports to reducing uncertainty about future price developments by strengthening the anchoring
of inflation expectations toward a numerical objective, dispersion of relative prices would increase
with any departure of inflation from the targeted level.
In fact, we find that the estimates of π ∗ are well within the announced target range of inflation
in most targeting countries, and that π̂ ∗ has declined over time as trend inflation did. π̂ ∗ is also
informative for nontargeters in identifying the public’s perception of inflation. Although nontargeters
do not announce quantitative inflation objectives, market expectations are formed anyway by what
the market believes the unannounced inflation target to be. This is particularly the case for the
nontargeters that are widely recognized as implicit targeters, where π̂ ∗ is found to match well with
the implicit target levels of inflation reported by other researchers. In this vein, it is fair to argue
that targeters have no clear superiority over implicit targeters with the reputation and commitment
for pursuing low inflation when it comes to the anchoring of the public’s inflation expectations to a
certain intended target level.
The story, however, changes somewhat significantly when we examine the eﬀectiveness of IT in
countries with high initial inflation rates. While targeters with high initial inflation could eﬀectively
stabilize market expectations of inflation around the targeted level of inflation, there is no clear
evidence of stabilizing inflation expectations in their nontargeting counterparts. Given that one
of the major criteria for the success of IT is the level of control it exerts on the public’s inflation
expectations, the potential gains from adopting IT are more pronounced in countries with high
inflation rates. Our findings therefore lend credence to the view that adoption of IT is more beneficial
to developing countries with typically high inflation rates.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes and presents a preliminary analysis of the data. Section 3 is devoted to a discussion of the econometric analysis of the
3

relationship between RPV and inflation in targeting and non-targeting countries. The robustness
of our regression results is also examined in that section. Section 4 discusses the implications of
the U-shaped relationship between RPV and inflation with a focus on π ∗ and its relationship to explicit/implicit target inflation rates. Section 5 concludes the paper. The Appendices contain detailed
descriptions of the data.

2

Data and preliminary analysis

The Data
Our data set comprises monthly (quarterly for Australia) indices of national consumer prices and
their subaggregates for twelve targeters, Australia (AUS), Brazil (BRA), Canada (CAN), Hungary
(HUN), Israel (ISR), Korea (KOR), Mexico (MEX), Norway (NOR), the Philippines (PHL), Sweden
(SWE), the United Kingdom (UK), and South Africa (ZAF), along with eight nontargeters, Argentina
(ARG), Switzerland (CHE), Germany (GER), Hong Kong (HK), Italy (ITA), Japan (JPN), Turkey
(TUR), and the United States (US).5 The number of subaggregate items varies across countries,
from five in TUR to seventeen in ZAF. Data limitations for these subaggregate price indices led
us to set the starting year of the sample period at 1984, which marks the onset of the so-called
‘Great Moderation’ period when the volatility of aggregate economic variables, including inflation,
declined significantly in most industrial countries. While the starting point is slightly diﬀerent for
some countries (GER, HUN, TUR, and UK), the end point of the data range is 2009:M2 (2009:Q1
for AUS) in all countries. The sources of the underlying data are listed in Table A.1 in the Appendix,
to which further details on the data have been relegated.
Table 1 presents the 20 countries that are categorized based on their initial inflation regime and
their adoption of IT.6 Although it is customary to sort countries into groups of industrial versus
developing nations, it is more appropriate here to classify them by their initial inflation regime in
view of its potential importance in the inflation-RPV nexus [e.g. Bick and Nautz 2008; Choi 2010].
Throughout the paper, high inflation countries are defined as those with average annual inflation
rates greater than ten percent in the pre-IT period, which encompasses BRA, HUN, ISR, PHL,
MEX, and ZAF for targeters and ARG and TUR for nontargeters, as listed in Table 1. Our sample
therefore comprises twelve low inflation economies and eight high inflation countries.
Inflation is measured in a standard way by calculating annualized percentage changes in the
consumer price index. Unless noted otherwise, we concentrate on the deseasonalized month-tomonth inflation rates, where the price indices are seasonally adjusted using the Census X12-method.

4

RPV is then constructed by calculating the standard deviation (s.d.) of the disaggregate inflation
rates,7

v
uN
uX
RP Vt = t
ω i (π it − π t )2
i=1

where π it = lnPit − lnPi,t−1 , π t =

PN

i=1 ω i π it ,

ω i denotes the fixed expenditure weight of the ith

product that sums to unity, and Pit represents the price index of ith good at time t.

Preliminary data analysis
Table 2 presents summary statistics on average inflation and RPV for each country for two subsample
periods, where the full sample is split by a certain break point. For targeters, the onset of their IT
regime is used as the break point8 , whereas the break points for nontargeters are determined by the
Bai-Perron’s (1998) multivariate structural break tests for their inflation series, as shown in Table 3.
A couple of observations can be made from Table 2. First, there exists a notable decline in
average inflation after the break point in all the countries considered, regardless of IT adoption.
This observation accords well with the findings by some earlier studies [e.g. Cecchetti and Debelle
2004; Levin and Piger 2004]. Not surprisingly, the fall in average inflation is more significant in the
high inflation countries, from double- or triple- digit annual inflation to single-digit annual inflation.
By contrast, no such universal decline is observed in RPV, with a marked decline only seen in high
inflation countries. It is a country’s initial inflation regime, rather than its IT status, that appears to
be important. In countries with low initial inflation rates, a shift in mean inflation is not associated
with any comparable reduction in the cross-sectional variation of relative prices. Average RPV has
actually increased after the break point in some low inflation countries, including targeters CAN,
NOR and the UK, and nontargeters CHE, GER, HK, and US. This finding casts some doubt about
the validity of the well-established positive relationship between inflation and RPV.
An essentially similar picture is painted in Figure 1, which portrays the empirical densities of
inflation and RPV before (solid line) and after (dashed line) the break point. As can be seen from
the plots, there is a remarkable diﬀerence between inflation and RPV in their empirical densities.
While the distribution of inflation clearly shifts leftward in most countries, reflecting the decline of
mean inflation, the distribution of RPV barely shifts after the break, except for the high inflation
countries. The structural connection between inflation and RPV captured by comovement of the
empirical densities can be found only in the high inflation countries, irrespective of IT adoption.
To throw additional light on this issue, we run the Bai-Perron structural break test on the
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RPV series and report the results in Table 3 along with those for inflation. While the outcomes of
these tests point strongly to the presence of structural changes in the inflation rates of almost all
countries, for RPV, evidence of a structural shift is found mainly in the high inflation countries.
Table 3 also reports the estimated dates for the structural breaks in inflation and RPV. Among
the eight countries that exhibit structural changes in both inflation rates and RPV, the timing of
the decline in inflation roughly matches that of RPV only in the high inflation countries. In some
targeters, such as CAN, HUN, KOR, MEX, and UK, the estimated break points in inflation rates are
close to the oﬃcial adoption dates of IT, lending support to the use of the IT adoption date as the
break point.9 In the other targeters, the timing of the decline in mean inflation is a bit earlier than
the formal announcement dates of IT adoption. Such a time lead, however, makes intuitive sense if
those countries stabilized inflation prior to making an oﬃcial announcement of IT adoption. Overall,
the results from the Bai-Perron method generally corroborate those from Table 2 and Figure 1.

3

Econometric analysis

Our discussion in the previous section suggests that a mean shift in inflation is accompanied by a
similar structural change in RPV in the high inflation countries but not in the low inflation countries.
This seemingly loose structural connection between inflation and RPV in the low inflation countries,
however, does not necessarily imply a collapse of the link between inflation and RPV, especially
when the two variables of interest are suspected to undergo some diﬀerent structural changes. One
might then reasonably ask to what extent (if at all) the adoption of IT has impacted RPV, once
the structural change in the inflation rate is properly taken into account. To investigate this, the
current section utilizes various econometric techniques to carry out a series of regression analyses. We
first implement a semi-parametric regression technique to identify the underlying functional form of
the relationship between inflation and RPV without imposing any prior assumptions. Based on the
information obtained regarding the functional form, we then apply a parametric regression technique
to two sub-samples split by the aforementioned break points. As a sensitivity analysis, we also
conduct a rolling regression analysis to check the robustness of our regression results to the choice
of break points.

Underlying functional form and semiparametric regression analysis
In the literature, the empirical evidence on the positive link between inflation and RPV is largely
built upon regression analysis, typically with inflation as the causal factor. A common feature of this
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existing literature is that the studies focus on linear relationships, although the linearity restriction is
often called into question [e.g. Parks 1978; Hartman 1991]. In the absence of any concrete guidance
from economic theory, a useful strategy to identify the underlying functional form is to utilize a
semi-parametric approach which involves combining the attractive features of both parametric and
nonparametric models.10 Following Fielding and Mizen (2008) and Choi (2010) on which this section
largely draws, we consider a partially linear regression model as follows,
RP Vt = Xt0 β + g(π t ) + εt ,

(1)

where Xt is a (p + q) × 1 vector of the regressors that includes the lagged terms of RPV and inflation,

Xt0 = {RP Vt−1 , ..., RP Vt−p , π t−1 , ..., π t−q }. g(·) is an unknown smooth diﬀerential function that
captures a contemporaneous eﬀect of inflation on RPV and determines the underlying functional

form of the relationship between inflation and RPV. The g(·) function in eq. (1) is estimated semiparametrically as illustrated by Choi (2010), with a particular emphasis on the estimation of g 0 (·),
the first derivatives of g(·).
Figure 2 plots the semiparametric estimates of the g 0 (·) function (solid line) along with the dotted
horizontal line that captures g 0 (·) = 0. Of interest is the point where the estimated g 0 (·) function
crosses the dotted horizontal line, which corresponds to the RPV-minimizing inflation rate, denoted
as π ∗ throughout the paper. If the inflation rate is below π ∗ , then g 0 (·) < 0 and g(·) is downwardsloping, while g 0 (·) > 0 and g(·) is upward-sloping if the inflation rate is above π ∗ . In most cases
considered, the fitted g 0 (·) function is approximately linear and upward sloping, and the transition
of g 0 (·) from negative to positive values indicates that g(·) has a quadratic form. This is particularly
the case for the countries with low initial inflation regardless of IT adoption. In those countries,
the point where g(·) intersects the dotted horizontal line, or π̂ ∗ , is lower in the second subsample,
implying that the U-shaped relationship shifts leftward as mean inflation falls.
Albeit overwhelming, the evidence of a U-shaped relationship is not ubiquitous. In the countries
with high initial inflation, the fitted g 0 (·) function does not cross the dotted horizontal line but
remains consistently above or below it, implying that the g(·) function is not quadratic but more
likely monotonic. This is the case for the high inflation targeters (BRA, HUN, ISR, and MEX) before
their adoption of IT, and for the high inflation nontargeters (ARG and TUR) in both subsample
periods. Notice that the underlying functional form between these two groups of high inflation
countries is quite diﬀerent in the second subsample. While it switches from monotonic to a U-shape
in the targeting high inflation countries, no such a transition is observed in the nontargeting high
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inflation countries. As will be discussed in more detail in Section 4, this result may reflect the
diﬀerence that IT adoption makes for the countries with high initial inflation.

The U-shaped relationship and parametric regression analysis
Our semi-parametric analysis suggests that a well-specified parametric model of the inflation-RPV
nexus should incorporate two features: (i) a structural change in the underlying model; and (ii)
a quadratic U-shaped profile. To accommodate the first feature, the full sample is split into two
subsamples based on the aforementioned break points. To capture the second feature, we employ
the following parametric model,
RP Vt = α0 +

p
X

αh RP Vt−h + β 1 π t + β 2 π 2t

+

q
X

γ j π t−j + εt .

(2)

j=1

h=1

where the lag lengths (p, q) are chosen by the BIC rule.11 This parametric specification can be seen
as general because it nests both linear and quadratic models. If β 2 in eq.(2) approaches zero, the
functional form collapses to linear and hence the overall relationship between RPV and inflation is
solely determined by β 1 . If β 2 is positive, the relationship is U-shaped and the minimum point of
dV takes on its lowest value. As shown by Choi (2010), the minimum
U-shape occurs at π ∗ where RP
point can be estimated by π̂ ∗ =

−β̂ 1
.
2β̂ 2

An important question regarding the U-shaped relationship is whether it is around zero (π ∗ = 0)

or around a non-zero inflation rate (π ∗ 6= 0). If the association is U-shaped around zero inflation,
RPV would monotonically increase with inflation (or deflation) and hence higher inflation causes a
larger dispersion of relative prices as documented by a large number of earlier studies. If, instead,
the relationship is U-shaped around a nonzero inflation rate, RPV rises not with the inflation rate
but with the deviation of inflation from π ∗ . The further away a shock drives inflation from π ∗ , the
more cross-sectionally dispersed relative prices become. π ∗ is also useful in tracking the stability of
the U-shaped relationship between inflation and RPV by looking at the time-varying behavior of π ∗ .
The parametric regression results reported in Table 4 warrant several comments. First, in most
cases under study, the relationship is U-shaped around a positive inflation rate which is significantly
diﬀerent from zero.12 As can be seen from the third and fourth columns of the upper panel of Table
4, the impact of inflation volatility on RPV is non-negative (β̂ 2 ≥ 0) in all cases, while that of the
inflation level is negative (β̂ 1 < 0) in the vast majority of cases, indicative of a U-shaped relationship
between inflation and RPV. As presented in the lower-left panel of Table 4, however, β̂ 1 is positive
in the pre-break period in both high inflation non-targeting countries and two of the high-inflation
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targeters, BRA and MEX. In these countries, the corresponding β̂ 2 is very close to zero and thus π ∗ is
not properly defined, suggesting that the underlying relationship is more likely to be positive linear.
Apart from them, π̂ ∗ is positive and significantly diﬀerent from zero in all countries, as the lower
bound of the 95 percent confidence interval for π̂ ∗ is consistently above zero. This result implies that
the RPV-related welfare cost of inflation is minimized when the inflation rate is above zero, rather
than zero.
Second, the underlying relationship between inflation and RPV is not stable over time, but instead
varies across inflation regimes in a systematic manner. This time variation is particularly noticeable
in the high inflation targeting countries, where the underlying relationship appears to switch from a
positive monotonic relationship (β̂ 1 > 0 and β̂ 2 ' 0) in the pre-break period to a U-shaped profile
(β̂ 1 < 0 and β̂ 2 > 0) in the post-break period. In the targeters with low initial inflation where the
evidence of a U-shaped profile is found in both subsample periods, we note a decrease in the value
of π̂ ∗ , reflecting a leftward shift of the U-shaped relationship. A broadly similar story is told for
nontargeters that have maintained low and stable inflation during the great moderation period.
Third, the link between inflation and RPV has become stronger after IT adoption in most targeters, when judged by a larger value of β̂ 2 in the post-IT period. In CAN, for example, the value of
β̂ 2 has increased almost six-fold, from 0.26 to 1.55. This increase in β̂ 2 signifies a steeper curvature
of the U-shape and hence a larger response of RPV to the same inflation shock that leads to a deviation of inflation from π ∗ .13 This result is posited to be driven by an increase in the degree of price
rigidity under IT.14 When inflation expectations are anchored to an announced inflation target, economic agents react more sluggishly to a temporary shock that drives inflation away from the targeted
inflation, causing a larger dispersion of relative prices. This stronger response of RPV to inflationary shocks, however, can be also seen from nontargeters, especially from those that maintained low
inflation with implicit but credible commitment to low inflation.

Robustness check using rolling regression analysis
To ensure that our results in the previous section are not driven by the choice of specific sample
periods, we appeal to the rolling regression approach that doesn’t impose any prior restrictions on
the timing of break points. This is an attractive feature when the full-sample estimates are vulnerable
to time variation in the conditional mean of the inflation process.
Figure 3 presents the estimates of β 1 and β 2 in eq.(2) from a sequence of rolling samples. Each
point in the plot exhibits β̂ 1 (thin line) and β̂ 2 (heavy line) at t that are obtained using data from
t−120 (t−40 for AUS) to t with a window of 10 years.15 The numbers on the horizontal axis therefore
9

represent the beginning year of each 10-year window. For instance, 1984 captures the subsample
period of 1984-1993, and so on. As anticipated, the rolling estimates of β 2 are consistently positive,
while those of β 1 are negative in most cases, indicating that the relationship between inflation and
RPV is U-shaped around a positive π ∗ . A notable exception, however, can be found in some high
inflation countries (BRA, MEX, ARG, and TUR) where β̂ 2 is close to zero in the early part of
sample period with β̂ 1 being positive. This suggests that the relationship is positive linear during
the corresponding sample period. In MEX for example, a high inflation targeter, β̂ 2 is close to zero
until around 1994 while β̂ 1 is positive, implying that the relationship between inflation and RPV in
MEX is positive linear until the subsample period of 1994-2003. After 1994, however, β̂ 2 in MEX
switches to positive and β̂ 1 swings to negative, indicative of a U-shaped profile.
The rolling estimates for β 1 and β 2 also display a significant variation over time. Our visual
inspection suggests that the timing of structural changes in the two coeﬃcient estimates roughly
coincides with the changes in the monetary policy regime reported in Table 3. For instance, the
timing of the structural change in β̂ 2 is very close to their oﬃcial adoption dates of IT in some
targeters, such as AUS, CAN, KOR, and UK.

4

π ∗ and target inflation

Our discussion so far suggests that the relationship between inflation and RPV is U-shaped around
a nonzero inflation rate in most countries, especially after IT adoption. A central implication of
the U-shaped relationship is that RPV changes not with inflation per se, but with the deviation of
inflation from π ∗ . Questions then naturally arise regarding how to interpret the nonzero π ∗ and how
π ∗ is related to the inflation target. This line of inquiry is pursued in the current section.

Interpretation of π ∗ and the inflation target
In empirical macro models, inflation rates are often partitioned into two parts: (i) its perceived
equilibrium attractor or the perceived central-bank target for inflation; and (ii) deviations from the
equilibrium [e.g. Kozicki and Tinsley 2008]. Since IT purports to reducing uncertainty about future
price developments by anchoring inflation expectations toward a numerical objective, the dispersion
of relative prices would be minimized if the actual inflation rate is equal to the inflation target.
Because RPV would rise with any deviation of actual inflation from the targeted inflation rate in
either direction, π ∗ can be viewed as conceptually related to the target level of inflation perceived by
the public [e.g. Kozicki and Tinsley 2005], or the central bank’s inflation target [e.g. Ireland 2007].
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In light of the fact that trend inflation is usually pinned down by a central bank’s target in general
equilibrium models, π ∗ is also related to trend inflation [e.g. Cogley and Sbordone 2008; Sbordone
2007].16 In this context, it would be instructive to examine whether the estimate of π ∗ is close to
the announced target level of inflation.
Table 4 presents the estimates of π ∗ before and after the break point, along with the explicit/implicit numerical targets for inflation. The results in Table 4 illustrate a couple of interesting
points with regard to π̂ ∗ . First, π̂ ∗ appears to have fallen into the target range of inflation after IT
adoption in eight out of twelve targeters, probably because a strong commitment to an announced
target helps the public to form expectations for the policy outcome [e.g. Woodford 2004]. In the
remaining four targeters (AUS, HUN, MEX, and PHL), π̂ ∗ stays outside the target range but not
far from the upper end of the target. Aside from AUS, this may be because more time is needed
for these countries to build credibility around the relatively recently adopted new monetary policy
framework.17
Second, π̂ ∗ is useful for nontargeters in identifying the market perception of the unannounced
inflation target, particularly in the nontargeters that are generally regarded as implicit targeters.
Although nontargeters do not announce any quantitative inflation objectives, market expectations
are still anchored by what the market believes the inflation target is. For example, some nontargeters, such as CHE, GER, JPN, and US, are widely recognized as de facto targeters because their
commitment to low inflation or price stability has been deeply embedded in their monetary policy
framework [e.g. Truman 2003].18 As shown in Table 4, the estimates of π ∗ for these implicit targeters
are well within the implied targets ranges reported by other researchers.

Time variation of π ∗ and trend inflation
Recently, growing evidence has emerged on the shifts in trend inflation over time [e.g. Amano,
Ambler, and Rebei 2007; Ireland 2007; Stock and Watson 2007; Cogley and Sbordone 2008]. Based
on a macro model with a time-varying inflation trend, for instance, Cogley and Sbordone (2008)
maintain that trend inflation in the U.S. has been nonzero and varied over time. A similar conclusion
is reached by Stock and Watson (2007) based on an unobserved component trend-cycle model with
stochastic volatility. Using the Kalman filter technique, Leigh (2008) also documents that the Fed’s
implicit target is not constant but instead has varied significantly over time, from near 3% in the
early 1980s, to 3-4% in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and to 1-2% after the 1990-1991 recession,
before rising to 2-3% during 2001-2004. Similarly, Ireland (2007) reports that the Fed’s inflation
target has increased from 1.25% in 1959 to more than 8% in the late 1970s, followed by a gradual
11

reduction to below 2.5% in 2004. This time variation of trend inflation is often explained by the
central bank’s updating its policy rule when it learns more about the structure of the economy.19
For example, Levin and Piger (2004) assert that movements in the mean of inflation reflect shifts
in private agent perceptions of the policy target for inflation. Since the central bank’s inflation
target bears particular relevance for the inflation expectations of the public, it would be of interest
to examine how closely the estimates of π ∗ match the expected inflation of economic agents.
Given the availability of a direct measure of inflation expectations for the US, we use that country
as a case study. Figure 4 reports the result of this exercise by plotting the evolution of π̂ ∗ in the U.S.
for a 10-year rolling window sample, together with the long-horizon inflation expectations from the
Survey of Professional Forecasters.20 As can be seen from the figure, π ∗ fits quite well the survey
measures of long-horizon inflation expectations in the U.S., confirming our prior intuition that π ∗ is
closely related to the inflation expectations of the public. The time-varying patterns of both π̂ ∗ and
inflationary expectations of the public are believed to be commonly driven by the changes in the
central-bank target for inflation. Unfortunately, data for long-term inflation expectations are not
available in many other countries under study. This led us to utilize the period average inflation as a
rough substitute for the market expectation of inflation. As depicted in Figure 4, the period average
inflation rates (dotted line) are closely linked to the expected inflation rates in the U.S.
Figure 5 plots the evolution of π̂ ∗ (heavy solid line) over time, together with the sample average
inflation rates (dotted line) and the targeted level/band of inflation (thin solid line) for all the
countries under study. Since π̂ ∗ is not properly defined in the high inflation countries before IT
adoption with β̂ 2 close to zero, we concentrate on the post-IT period for those high inflation countries.
A couple of important features emerge from Figure 5.
First, π̂ ∗ has steadily declined over time in most countries, in a similar pattern to that exhibited
by period average inflation. In some countries, especially in US, JPN, and HK, π̂ ∗ moves in sync with
the period average inflation rates, consistent with the recent empirical evidence on time-varying trend
inflation. In the two nontargeting high inflation countries (ARG and TUR), however, π̂ ∗ diverges
from the period average inflation rate, most likely due to a weak anchoring of inflation expectations
in those countries.
Second and more important, π̂ ∗ is already within the announced target range of inflation in
all of the low inflation targeters, with the exception of AUS and NOR where π̂ ∗ recently moved
out of the target range. This may mirror the indirect evidence of IT’s eﬀectiveness in reducing
inflation expectations toward the announced target after IT adoption. Some targeters managed to
contain inflation expectations within a prescribed narrow band in a relatively short time, although it
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appears to have taken a bit longer in others. In CAN, for instance, π̂ ∗ fell rapidly below the targeted
inflation level right after the adoption of IT, indicative of a quick adjustment of the public’s inflation
expectations after the adoption of the new monetary policy framework. A broadly similar pattern is
observed in the nontargeting countries that are widely known as de facto targeters. In CHE, GER,
ITA, JPN, and US, for example, π̂ ∗ is well within their implicit target range for inflation estimated
by other researchers. Our result therefore supports the finding by Ball and Sheridan (2005) that
targeters do not necessarily entertain a clear advantage in anchoring inflation expectations, compared
to the nontargeters that have maintained low and stable inflation without explicitly adopting IT.
The story, however, changes somewhat significantly when we look at the countries with high
initial inflation rates. Although π̂ ∗ in some high inflation targeters (HUN, MEX, PHL) is yet to fall
within the target range, it seems to be moving toward it after IT adoption. This may be because
they are still building the credibility of the new monetary policy framework having adopted IT
relatively recently. By contrast, no such pattern of moving toward a certain level of inflation can
be seen in their nontargeting counterparts. Interestingly, a significant diﬀerence exists between the
two nontargeting high inflation countries. While π̂ ∗ consistently deviates from the sample average
inflation rate in ARG, the gap between π̂ ∗ and the sample average inflation has diminished steadily
over time in TUR. This diﬀerence may rest on the fact that TUR has adopted IT in 2006, but
is considered here as a nontargeter. These results, therefore, support our prior intuition that IT
serves to reshape inflation expectations, particularly in initially high inflation countries without a
well-defined numerical inflation objectives.
Overall, our results highlight the informativeness of π̂ ∗ regarding inflation expectations formed
by economic agents in both targeters and nontargeters. π̂ ∗ is instrumental in identifying the public’s
expectations of inflation for nontargeters, while, for targeters, in assessing the eﬀectiveness of IT in
establishing a credible nominal anchor. Given that one of the major criteria for the success of IT
is the level of control it exerts on the public’s inflation expectations, our results oﬀer qualitative
support for the view that IT is more beneficial to countries with initially high inflation rates.

5

Concluding remarks

Inflation targeting has become a popular monetary policy framework in the past two decades, largely
for its success in reducing both inflation and inflation volatility. This paper investigates whether and
how the adoption of IT exerts a significant influence on the variability of relative prices as it did on
inflation. Grappling with this question is crucial not just in evaluating the eﬀectiveness of IT beyond
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its impact on aggregate inflation, but in understanding the transmission mechanism of inflation as a
key element of the standard New Keynesian DSGE models.
By examining twelve targeting countries and eight nontargeting countries, we first find that what
matters for RPV is not IT adoption per se but the inflation regime prior to the adoption of IT. RPV
has fallen with mean inflation rates only in the countries with high initial inflation rates, regardless
of whether they targeted inflation or not. Once the structural change in inflation is accounted for,
however, our regression analysis suggests that the connection between inflation and RPV has become
tighter after IT adoption, with the same shocks to inflation leading to a larger dispersion of relative
prices. This tighter relationship in the later sub-sample is not unique to inflation targeters, however.
We also find that the relationship between inflation and RPV takes a U-shaped profile around
a non-zero inflation rate in most of the countries under study. An important implication of this
is that RPV changes not with the inflation rate as widely accepted in the literature, but with the
deviation of inflation from π ∗ at which RPV is minimized. Insofar as economic agents anchor their
expectations of inflation around the target level, relative prices would become more dispersed as the
public responds more sluggishly to the shocks that drive actual inflation away from the targeted
level. In this vein, π ∗ can be viewed as conceptually related to the inflation target level perceived
by the public, and to trend inflation which is often pinned down by a central bank’s target. Our
estimates of π ∗ are also informative about the market perception of the unannounced inflation target
in nontargeting countries. For low-inflation nontargeters, we find that the estimates of π ∗ match
quite well with the implicit inflation targets reported by other researchers.
When it comes to the anchoring of inflation expectations as measured by π ∗ , therefore, targeters
seem to have no clear advantage over the implicit targeters with a comparable commitment to low
inflation. The eﬀectiveness of IT, however, stands out when countries with high initial inflation
rates are considered. While IT serves to anchor inflation expectations in the targeters with high
initial inflation rates, no clear signs of stabilization of inflation expectations are observed in their
non-targeting counterparts. Our findings therefore support the argument that adoption of IT is
potentially more beneficial to developing countries with typically high inflation rates.
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Notes
1 Since

the work of Vining and Elwertowski (1976), a sizable literature documents a positive
relationship between inflation and the cross sectional variability of relative prices for many countries
and for various time periods. See Lastrapes (2006) and Becker and Nautz (2009) for more recent
empirical evidence on the positive relationship. Choi (2010), however, recently reports empirical
evidence that the relationship is not only non-monotonic but also exhibits significant variation over
inflation regimes.
2 For

an opposing view, see Ball and Sheridan (2005) who find little evidence that IT improves
macroeconomic performance for a group of OECD countries.
3 As

is formally defined in Section 2.1, we consider high inflation as an average annual inflation
rate higher than ten percent before the adoption of IT.
4 Using

simulation experiments, Choi (2010) shows that a modified Calvo model which embeds
sectoral heterogeneity in price rigidity can explain this feature of data.
5 The

selection of countries was mainly guided by the availability of suﬃciently long continuous
data series for subaggregate consumer price indices. Turkey adopted IT in January 2006, but is
counted as a nontargeter in our study because it was a nontargeter for most of our sample period.
6 We

follow much of the literature in categorizing targeters based on de jure rather than de facto
targeting.
7 Since

inflation data is used for RPV, the term relative inflation variability is more appropriate.
Throughout the paper, however, we follow the convention in the literature and call this measure
relative price variability (RPV), the term that has been ingrained in the literature since the goldstandard era. In fact, the literature reports largely similar results for the inflation-RPV nexus when
price-level data are used for constructing RPV [e.g. Parsley 1996].
8 The

exact timing of IT adoption varies with the definition of targeting. While some authors [e.g.
Bernanke et al. 1999] date the start of targeting at the point when targets were first announced,
some others [e.g. Ball and Sheridan 2005] date based on actual implementation, which often lags the
announcements. Here we stick to the former approach, but the diﬀerence between the two dates is
not consequential in most countries under scrutiny.
9 Due

to the substantive heterogeneity observed in the break points across country, panel data
analysis is of reduced merit here as the subsample panels would become ‘unbalanced’ or ‘incomplete’,
which either imposes a serious limitation in the eﬃciency gain or makes the estimation infeasible. This
problem is known to be exacerbated in dynamic panel models containing lagged terms of dependent
variables as in our case.
10 By

combining the easy interpretability of the parametric approach with some of the flexibility
of the nonparametric approach, the semiparametric approach is known to get around the so-called
‘curse of dimensionality’ problem while allowing for flexibility in functional form.
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11 Inclusion

of the square term of inflation (π 2t ) is also consistent with the findings by some earlier
studies [e.g. Parks 1978; Hartman 1991] that inflation volatility is a significant explanatory variable
of RPV.
12 This

is consistent with the point made by Sbordone (2007) that trend inflation, no matter how
it is defined, has rarely been zero over past decades, even when a 1% upward bias is allowed for in
the measured inflation rate.
13 As

shown in Choi (2010), the marginal eﬀect of a deviation of inflation from π ∗ can be approxt
imated by ∆RPV
≈ 2β 2 π dt which solely depends on β 2 , where π dt = π t − π ∗ denotes the inflation
∆π dt
deviation. While the table only includes the contemporaneous eﬀect of inflation on RPV, we find
qualitatively similar results for the cumulative eﬀect regarding the greater impact in the post-break
period. We also find that adding country characteristic variables as regressors does not alter much
the conclusions reached in this paper. These results are not reported here to preserve space, but
are available from the authors upon request. The authors are grateful to an anonymous referee for
bringing these issues to our attention.
14 The

potential impact of nominal rigidities on the inflation-RPV nexus can be analyzed separately
from that of sectoral productivity or demand shocks within a VAR framework as in Lastrapes (2006).
This important issue, however, is left for future research as it goes beyond the scope of the current
paper.
15 Similar

results are obtained using rolling windows of 8 and 12 years.

16 The

deviation of inflation from π ∗ is also similar in spirit to the inflation gap described by Cogley,
Primiceri, and Sargent (2010) and Sbordone (2007). Cogley, Primiceri, and Sargent (2010) define
the inflation gap as deviations of inflation from a time-varying inflation trend. Alternatively, the
deviation can be viewed as the gap between actual inflation and expected inflation as in Grier and
Perry (1996).
17 According

to the Reserve Bank of Australia’s statements on monetary policy, AUS experienced
a large deviation of inflation from the target level in the early 2000s mainly due to higher oil prices
and tax changes. A Goods and Service tax (GST) introduced in July 2000 to replace the existing
wholesale sales tax (WST) has led to large increases in price indices between June 2000 and September
2001.
18 Although

the Fed has never oﬃcially stated a target range of inflation, many observers suggest
that the Fed has in fact practiced implicit inflation targeting during the Volcker-Greenspan era
[e.g. Goodfriend 2003]. Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1998) report that the estimate of the Federal
Reserve’s unobserved implicit inflation target is around 4%. According to Kuzin (2006), the German
Bundesbank’s implicit inflation target was more than 4% in 1975 but declined to near 2% in 1998. In
Japan, it is broadly recognized that the Bank of Japan views 0-2% as the appropriate level of inflation
in the medium to long run ( http://www.boj.or.jp/en/type/release/zuiji_new/k060309b.htm).
19 As

pointed out by Ireland (2007), transitory movements in the measured rate of inflation can be
driven by various shocks, but large and persistent movements in inflation cannot occur without the
help of monetary policy.
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20 The

sequence of ten-year-ahead inflation expectations is a widely reported measure of longrun inflation expectations, which was downloaded from the website of the Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia (http://www.phil.frb.org/).
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Table 1: Country classification
low inflation

ITers
[6] AUS, CAN, KOR, NOR, SWE, UK

non-ITers
[6] CHE, GER, HK, ITA, JPN, US

high inflation

[6] BRA, HUN, ISR, MEX, PHL, ZAF

[2] ARG, TUR

Note: Numbers in the bracket represent the number of countries in the group. High inflation countries are defined as those
with average annual inflation rates greater than 10 percent before IT adoption (for ITers) or breakpoints (for non-ITers).

Table 2: Summary Statistics for Inflation and RPV
Month-to-month
Inflation

12-month
RPV

Inflation

RPV

Pre-IT
Post-IT
Pre-IT
Post-IT
Pre-IT
Post-IT
Pre-IT
Post-IT
AUS
1.42 [0.84]
0.67 [0.56] 1.11 [0.48] 0.89 [0.44]
5.73 [2.69]
2.69 [1.42]
2.86 [1.22] 2.45 [0.88]
BRA 12.14 [11.34]
0.56 [0.41] 2.26 [1.86] 0.47 [0.26]
151.35 [117.56]
6.80 [2.93] 11.18 [6.62] 3.18 [1.01]
CAN
0.34 [0.27]
0.15 [0.26] 0.40 [0.27] 0.45 [0.33]
4.08 [1.15]
2.06 [1.15]
1.60 [0.66] 1.93 [1.01]
HUN
1.34 [0.66]
0.42 [0.34] 0.71 [0.59] 0.57 [0.45]
16.24 [5.49]
5.46 [1.79]
4.28 [1.30] 3.57 [1.24]
ISR
3.06 [4.66]
0.21 [0.47] 1.48 [1.02] 0.81 [0.37]
35.90 [48.97]
2.73 [2.83]
5.90 [2.50] 3.10 [1.05]
KOR
0.47 [0.42]
0.24 [0.30] 0.63 [0.38] 0.60 [0.31]
5.53 [2.01]
3.16 [1.51]
3.42 [1.00] 2.78 [0.75]
MEX
2.61 [2.26]
0.37 [0.20] 0.86 [0.78] 0.36 [0.19]
31.16 [24.28]
4.59 [0.99]
5.27 [3.51] 1.87 [0.58]
NOR
0.32 [0.25]
0.15 [0.43] 0.41 [0.26] 0.65 [0.50]
3.82 [2.12]
1.90 [1.34]
2.07 [0.71] 3.17 [1.04]
PHL
0.88 [1.10]
0.44 [0.42] 0.58 [0.52] 0.41 [0.28]
10.48 [9.20]
5.35 [2.49]
3.40 [1.37] 2.29 [1.29]
SWE
0.51 [0.51]
0.12 [0.29] 0.72 [0.65] 0.54 [0.33]
6.24 [2.47]
1.60 [1.35]
3.15 [1.55] 2.60 [0.85]
U.K.
0.46 [0.33]
0.16 [0.17] 0.38 [0.19] 0.44 [0.19]
6.04 [1.37]
1.92 [0.76]
2.16 [0.55] 2.71 [0.77]
ZAF
0.90 [0.52]
0.49 [0.45] 1.02 [0.76] 0.83 [0.47]
11.07 [3.72]
5.83 [3.19]
4.80 [1.85] 4.53 [1.43]
.............................................................................................................................
ARG 15.64 [15.45]
0.58 [1.33] 2.86 [2.07] 0.64 [0.54]
193.93 [115.27] 10.45 [20.16] 11.18 [4.44] 3.76 [2.78]
CHE
0.27 [0.24]
0.08 [0.20] 0.41 [0.30] 0.42 [0.35]
3.19 [1.68]
1.80 [0.47]
1.04 [0.77] 1.76 [0.85]
GER
0.25 [0.28]
0.12 [0.20] 0.37 [0.40] 0.45 [0.36]
2.86 [1.45]
1.54 [0.67]
1.78 [0.78] 2.18 [0.85]
H.K.
0.61 [0.38] -0.03 [0.56] 0.56 [0.30] 0.91 [0.96]
7.49 [2.35]
-0.13 [3.09]
2.73 [0.51] 3.42 [1.79]
ITA
0.51 [0.21]
0.19 [0.11] 0.32 [0.22] 0.23 [0.12]
5.96 [1.84]
2.41 [0.75]
1.51 [0.60] 1.18 [0.47]
JPN
0.13 [0.30]
0.00 [0.23] 0.39 [0.26] 0.33 [0.24]
1.58 [1.13]
0.06 [0.86]
1.54 [0.59] 1.31 [0.49]
TUR
4.67 [2.11]
1.63 [1.34] 2.48 [1.30] 1.43 [0.85]
57.28 [11.40] 21.67 [13.60]
8.24 [2.69] 5.87 [1.88]
U.S.
0.27 [0.18]
0.21 [0.34] 0.25 [0.16] 0.46 [0.47]
3.23 [1.12]
2.79 [1.03]
1.40 [0.67] 1.86 [1.02]
Note: The entries are the mean values of inflation rates and RPV during the corresponding period and the numbers
in brackets denote their standard deviations. For non-ITers, the breakpoints are determined by the Bai-Perron’s (1998)
multivariate structural break tests for inflation series. Bold face indicates the high inflation countries and their average
annual inflation rates during the pre-IT period.
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Table 3: Results of the Bai-Perron Test
IT-adoption
date
AUS
BRA

1993:Q2
1999:M6

CAN
HUN

1991:M2
2001:M6

ISR

1997:M6

KOR
MEX

1998:M4
2001:M1

Inflation

RPV

Break date
1990:Q4
1994:M6

CI
[90:Q1-91:Q4]
[94:M6-00:M9]

1991:M1
1997:M7
2001:M7
-

[89:M8-91:M7]
[97:M5-98:M4]
[00:M10-02:M6]
-

Break date
1992:M3
1996:M2
2003:M8
-

CI
[92:M3-95:M5]
[96:M12-96:M6]
[03:M1-06:M12]
-

1987:M9
1993:M4
1990:M1

[87:M7-90:M6]
[92:M10-94:M11]
[89:M12-91:M1]

1998:M3
[97:M1-02:M12]
1988:M4
[87:M12-89:M12]
1999:M3
[99:M3-05:M7]
NOR
2001:M3
1989:M7
[88:M8-90:M3]
2001:M1
[97:M8-01:M9]
PHL
2002:M1
SWE
1993:M1
1991:M12
[91:M7-92:M11]
U.K.
1992:M10
1992:M1
[91:M11-92:M8]
2005:M12
[03:M8-06:M7]
ZAF
2000:M2
1993:M5
[92:M5-93:M9]
.........................................................................................
ARG
1991:M4
[91:M4-96:M2]
1991:M6
[91:M6-93:M2]
CHE
1988:M12
[88:M1-89:M9]
1993:M6
[93:M3-93:M12]
GER
1992:M10
[92:M8-94:M4]
H.K.
1997:M3
[96:M9-97:M5]
ITA
1995:M11
[95:M9-96:M7]
1991:M10
[90:M8-94:M7]
JPN
1993:M8
[91:M12-96:M2]
TUR
2002:M3
[02:M2-02:M9]
2000:M12
[00:M9-01:M12]
U.S.
1999:M9
[97:M12-00:M10]
-

Note: ‘IT-adoption’ represents the month (quarter for AUS) and year of the inflation target announcement as explained
in section 2.2. Entries represent the occurrence of break points in the year and month estimated by the sequential procedure
estimation method of Bai and Perron (1998,2003). In brackets are the 90% confidence intervals (CI) for the end dates. We
consider a partial structural change model of yt = x0t β + zt0 δ j + ut with t = Tj−1 + 1, ..., Tj , by setting RP V or inflation as yt ,
the lagged terms of dependent variable as xt , and constant term as zt such that the coeﬃcients for the constant term are allowed
to shift. By adding lagged terms of dependent variable as regressors, no serial correlation is assumed in the errors terms, {ut }.
Following the guidelines from Bai and Perron, we assume that the break does not occur during the initial 15 percent nor the final
15 percent of the sample period in testing for structural breaks. The maximum number of breaks is set to five and minimum
regime size to 5 percent of sample. Robust standard errors used based on a quadratic spectral kernel HAC estimator with AR(1)
prewhitening filters. An entry of “-” indicates that the series does not exhibit a statistically significant break.

21

Table 4: Parametric regression results
Full sample

Numerical target
∗

(p, q)
β̂ 1 (s.e.)
β̂ 2 (s.e.)
π̂
[5%,95%]
(%)
AUS
(1,0)
-0.44 (0.02)
0.21 (0.00)
4.3‡
[ 3.1, 5.4]
2-3 (since 1993)
BRA
(1,0)
0.09 (0.00)
0.00 (0.00)
351.6‡
[ 242.6, 460.6]
2.5-6.5 (since 2005))
CAN
(1,0)
-0.44 (0.00)
0.54 (0.00)
4.9‡
[ 3.7, 6.1]
1-3 (since 1994)
HUN
(1,0)
-0.15 (0.01)
0.19 (0.00)
4.7‡
[ -0.3, 9.7]
2-4 (since 2006)
ISR
(2,9)
0.04 (0.00)
0.01 (0.00)
-40.2
[ -156.5, 76.2]
1-3 (since 2003)
KOR
(1,0)
-0.40 (0.01)
0.60 (0.00)
4.0‡
[ 3.1, 4.9]
2-4 (since 2003)
MEX
(1,2)
0.27 (0.00)
0.01 (0.00)
-270.0
[ -702.6, 162.5]
3 (since 2003)
NOR
(1,0)
-0.54 (0.00)
0.86 (0.00)
3.8‡
[ 3.1, 4.4]
2.5 (since 2001)
PHL
(7,0)
-0.20 (0.00)
0.22 (0.00)
5.4‡
[ 3.5, 7.4]
2.5-4.5 (since 2009)
SWE
(3,0)
-0.23 (0.00)
0.48 (0.00)
2.8‡
[ 1.5, 4.2]
1-3 (since 1993)
U.K.
(3,0)
-0.16 (0.00)
0.25 (0.00)
3.7‡
[ 1.5, 5.9]
2 (since 1997)
ZAF
(1,0)
-0.42 (0.02)
0.39 (0.00)
6.5‡
[ 4.0, 8.9]
3-6 (since 2006)
...................................................................................................................................
ARG
(5,2)
0.02 (0.00)
0.00 (0.00)
653.2‡
[ 225.9,1080.5]
n.a.
CHE
(3,0)
-0.54 (0.01)
1.32 (0.02)
2.4‡
[ 1.9, 3.0]
2
GER
(1,0)
-0.25 (0.02)
1.06 (0.02)
1.4‡
[ 0.2, 2.7]
2
H.K.
(1,0)
-0.35 (0.00)
0.45 (0.00)
3.0‡
[ 2.0, 3.9]
n.a
ITA
(1,0)
-0.32 (0.01)
0.72 (0.02)
2.6‡
[ 1.7, 3.6]
2
JPN
(1,0)
-0.15 (0.00)
0.60 (0.00)
1.5‡
[ 0.6, 2.4]
0-2
TUR
(1,0)
0.31 (0.00)
0.00 (0.00)
1714.4
[-9371, 12800]
2-6
U.S.
(4,0)
-0.53 (0.00)
1.17 (0.00)
2.7‡
[ 2.4, 3.1]
2-3
Before break

After break
∗

(p, q)
β̂ 1 (s.e.)
β̂ 2 (s.e.)
π̂
[5%,95%]
(p, q)
β̂ 1 (s.e.)
β̂ 2 (s.e.)
π̂ ∗
[5%,95%]
AUS
(1,0)
-0.64 (0.09)
0.26 (0.01)
5.0‡
[ 3.6, 6.4]
(1,0)
-0.34 (0.03)
0.19 (0.00)
3.7‡
[ 1.4, 5.9]
BRA
(1,0)
0.07 (0.00)
0.00 (0.00)
359.8‡
[ 165.0, 554.5]
(2,0)
-0.10 (0.01)
0.22 (0.00)
2.8
[-2.0, 7.7]
CAN
(1,0)
-0.10 (0.03)
0.26 (0.01)
2.4
[ -4.3, 9.0]
(1,0)
-0.51 (0.00)
1.55 (0.01)
2.0‡
[ 1.5, 2.5]
HUN
(1,0)
-0.02 (0.04)
0.15 (0.00)
0.7
[ -14.5, 15.9]
(1,0)
-0.58 (0.02)
0.81 (0.01)
4.3‡
[ 2.7, 5.9]
ISR
(2,9)
-0.01 (0.00)
0.01 (0.00)
-16.7
[ -138.9, 105.5]
(1,0)
-0.06 (0.01)
0.12 (0.00)
2.4
[-5.4, 10.1]
KOR
(1,0)
-0.56 (0.01)
0.68 (0.00)
4.9‡
[ 4.0, 5.9]
(1,0)
-0.25 (0.01)
0.75 (0.03)
2.0‡
[ 0.6, 3.4]
MEX
(1,2)
0.29 (0.01)
0.01 (0.00)
-283.7
[ -888.0, 320.7]
(1,0)
-1.75 (0.05)
2.36 (0.09)
4.4‡
[ 4.1, 4.8]
NOR
(1,0)
-0.33 (0.02)
0.56 (0.02)
3.6‡
[ 2.0, 5.2]
(4,0)
-0.30 (0.01)
0.76 (0.00)
2.4‡
[ 1.3, 3.5]
PHL
(7,0)
-0.18 (0.00)
0.21 (0.00)
5.4‡
[ 3.0, 7.9]
(1,0)
-0.49 (0.01)
0.50 (0.00)
5.7‡
[ 4.4, 7.0]
SWE
(3,0)
-0.21 (0.02)
0.47 (0.00)
2.7
[ -0.2, 5.7]
(1,0)
-0.21 (0.01)
0.66 (0.02)
1.9‡
[ 0.1, 3.7]
U.K.
(1,0)
-0.10 (0.02)
0.22 (0.00)
2.8
[ -3.9, 9.6]
(1,0)
-0.34 (0.01)
1.50 (0.05)
1.3‡
[ 0.8, 1.9]
ZAF
(1,0)
-0.25 (0.04)
0.30 (0.01)
6.3‡
[ 2.8, 9.8]
(1,0)
-0.88 (0.02)
0.87 (0.01)
6.0‡
[ 4.2, 7.1]
...................................................................................................................................
ARG
(1,1)
0.04 (0.00)
0.00 (0.00)
796.9‡ [ 175.4, 1418.4]
(8,0)
-0.02 (0.00)
0.04 (0.00)
3.3
[-4.5, 11.0]
CHE
(1,3)
-0.47 (0.02)
1.11 (0.04)
2.5‡
[ 1.6, 3.5]
(3,0)
-0.51 (0.01)
1.94 (0.08)
1.6†
[ 0.9, 2.2]
GER
(3,0)
-0.42 (0.04)
1.11 (0.02)
2.3‡
[ 0.4, 4.1]
(1,0)
-0.32 (0.02)
2.02 (0.13)
1.0‡
[ 0.2, 1.7]
H.K.
(1,0)
-0.38 (0.00)
0.39 (0.00)
5.4‡
[ 4.1, 6.6]
(1,1)
0.40 (0.06)
0.61 (0.02)
-1.9‡
[-3.3, -0.5]
ITA
(1,0)
-0.09 (0.19)
0.46 (0.17)
1.2
[ -7.8, 10.3]
(1,0)
-0.76 (0.02)
2.40 (0.12)
1.9‡
[ 1.5, 2.3]
JPN
(1,0)
-0.18 (0.01)
0.56 (0.01)
1.9‡
[ 0.6, 3.1]
(1,0)
-0.03 (0.00)
1.92 (0.06)
0.1
[-0.3, 0.5]
TUR
(1,0)
0.30 (0.01)
0.00 (0.00)
1236.8
[-7141, 9614]
(1,0)
-0.28 (0.01)
0.10 (0.00)
17.3‡ [ 9.1, 25.5]
U.S.
(4,0)
-0.85 (0.01)
1.43 (0.02)
3.6‡
[ 3.2, 4.0]
(1,0)
-0.43 (0.00)
1.18 (0.00)
2.2‡
[ 1.6, 2.8]
Note: Regression equation is
RP Vt = α0 +

p
[

αh RP Vt−h + β 1 π t + β 2 π 2t +

q
[

γ j πt−j + εt ,

j=1

h=1

where the lag lengths (p, q) are selected by the BIC rule. Break points are IT adoption date for ITers and structural breakpoints


−β̂ 1
of inflation for non-ITers. π̂ ∗ is the annualized monthly inflation rate, obtained from π̂∗ =
× 12. 5% and 95% inside
2β̂ 2

the squared bracket represent the lower and upper bounds of the 95% confidence interval of π̂∗ which is calculated using the
delta method. ‡represents that H0 : π ∗ = 0 can be rejected at 5%. The numerical inflation targets are obtained from the IMF’s
Monetary Bulletin (2007-2) and central banks’ websites.
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Figure captions

Figure 1: Empirical densities of inflation and RPV before (solid line) and after (dotted line)
break points
Figure 2: Nonparametric estimates of g 0 (·) function for diﬀerent values of inflation (π t )
Figure 3: Rolling 10-year estimates of marginal eﬀects of inflation (β 1 : thin line) and inflation
volatility (β 2 : heavy line) on RPV
Figure 4: π̂ ∗ (thin line), long-run inflation expectations (heavy line), and the period average
inflation rate (dotted line) in the U.S.
Figure 5: Rolling 10-year estimates of π ∗ (heavy solid line) with period average inflation rates
(dotted line) and targeted inflation range (thin solid line)
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Figure 1: Empirical densities of inflation and RPV before (solid line) and after (dotted line) break points
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Figure 2: Nonparametric estimates of g 0 (·) function for diﬀerent values of inflation (π t )
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Figure 3: Rolling 10-year estimates of marginal eﬀects of inflation (β 1 : thin line) and inflation
volatility (β 2 : heavy line) on RPV
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Figure 4: π̂ ∗ (thin line), long-run inflation expectations (heavy line), and the period average inflation
rate (dotted line) in the U.S.
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Figure 5: Rolling 10-year estimates of π ∗ (heavy solid line) with period average inflation rates (dotted
line) and targeted inflation range (thin solid line)
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Appendix: Data Description
Table A.1: Data Description
Country
AUS

Data span
1984:Q1-2009:Q1
{1993:Q2}

Data source
Australian Bureau
of Statistics (ABS)

Subaggregate Items
[8] food (20.7); alcohol and tobacco (9.2); clothing and footwear (5.2);
housing (26.2); household contents and services (12.9);
transportation (17.6); communication (4.4); education (3.6)

BRA

1984:M1-2009:M2
{1999:M6}

Brazilian Institute
of Geography and
Statistics (IBGE)

[7] food products and beverages (23.6); housing (16.7); household articles
(6.4); apparel (8.4); transportation and communication (20.1); health and
personal care (10.3); personal expenses (14.6)

CAN

1984:M1-2009:M2
{1991:M2}

Statistics Canada

[8] food (17.0); shelter (26.6); household operations and furnishings (11.1);
clothing and footwear (5.4); transportation (19.9); health and personal
care (4.7); recreation, education and reading (12.2); alcoholic beverages
and tobacco products (3.1)

HUN

1992:M1-2009:M2
{2001:M6}

Hungarian Central
Statistical Oﬃce
(KSH)

[7] food (23.7); alcoholic beverages and tobacco (9.6); clothing and
footwear (5.6); consumer durable goods (7.3); electric gas and other
fuels (8.5); other goods including motor fuels and lubricants (16.8);
services (28.5)

ISR

1984:M1-2009:M2
{1997:M6}

Central Bureau of
Statistics

[10] food, excluding vegetables and fruit (14.8); vegetables and fruit (3.6);
housing (20.7); dwellings maintenance (10.6); furniture and household
equipment (3.8); clothing and footwear (3.2); health (5.2); education,
culture and entertainment (12.5); transport and communication (21.1);
miscellaneous (4.5)

KOR

1984:M1-2009:M2
{1998:M4}

Korea National
Statistical oﬃce
(NSO)

[12] food and non-alcoholic beverages (14.0); alcoholic beverages and
cigarettes (1.5); clothing and footwear (5.8); housing, water and fuels (17.0);
furnishings and household equipment (4.2); health (5.2); transportation
(10.9); communication (6.0); culture and Recreation (5.6); education (11.1);
eating-out and accommodation (13.3); miscellaneous (5.4)

MEX

1984:M1-2009:M2
{2001:M1}

Bank of Mexico

[8] food, beverages and tobacco (22.7); clothes, footwear and accessories
(5.6); housing (26.4); furniture and domestic accessories (4.9); health and
personal care (8.6); transportation (13.4); education and entertainment
(11.5); miscellaneous (6.9)

NOR

1984:M1-2009:M2
{2001:M3}

Statistics Norway

[12] food and non-alcoholic beverages (11.2); alcoholic beverages and
tobacco (2.7); clothing and footwear (5.9); housing, water, electricity, gas
and other fuels (29.5); furnishings, household equipment and routine
maintenance (6.3); health (2.7); transport (17.9); communications (2.1);
recreation and culture (12.0); education (0.3); restaurants and hotels (3.4);
miscellaneous goods and services (6.0)

PHL

1984:M1-2009:M2
{2002:M1}

Philippines National
Statistical Oﬃce

[6] food, beverages and tobacco (50.0); clothing (3.0); housing and repairs
(16.8); fuel,light and water (6.9); services (15.9); miscellaneous (7.3)

SWE

1984:M1-2009:M2
{1993:M1}

Statistics Sweden

[11] food and non-alcoholic beverages (13.2); alcoholic beverages and
tobacco (3.7); clothing and footwear (5.4); housing, water, electricity, gas
and other fuels (26.7); furnishings and household goods (5.5); health (3.2);
transport (14.6); communication (3.5); recreation and culture (11.9);
restaurants and hotels (6.8); miscellaneous goods and services (5.4)

U.K.

1988:M1-2009:M2
{1992:M10}

National Statistics

[12] food and non-alcoholic beverages (11.8); clothing and footwear (5.7);
alcoholic beverages,tobacco and narcotics (4.4); housing, water and
fuels (12.6); furnishings, household equipment and routine repair of
house (6.6); health (2.2); transport (15.1); communication (2.3); recreation
and culture (14.5); education (2.1); hotels, cafes and restaurants (12.8);
miscellaneous goods and services (9.9)
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ZAF

1984:M1-2009:M2
{2000:M2}

Statistics South
Africa

[17] food (21.0); non-alcoholic beverages (1.1); alcoholic beverages (1.4);
cigarettes, cigars and tobacco (1.1); clothing and footwear (3.3);
housing (22.1); fuel and power (3.5); furniture and equipment (2.5);
household operation (4.8); medical care and health expenses (7.2);
transport (14.8); communication (3.0); recreation and entertainment (3.3);
reading matter (0.4); education (3.5); personal care (3.7); other (3.3)
.................................................................................................................................
ARG
1984:M1-2009:M2
National institute of
[9] foods and beverages (31.3); apparel (5.2); housing and basic services
{1991:M4}
Statistic and Censuses
(12.7); household equipment and maintenance (6.5); medical attention and
(INDEC)
health-care expenses (10.0); transportation and communication (17.0);
leisure (8.7); education (4.2); miscellaneous goods and services (4.4)
CHE

1984:M1-2009:M2
{1993:M6}

Federal Statistical
Oﬃce

[12] food and non-alcoholic beverages (10.9); alcoholic beverages
and tobacco (1.7); clothing and footwear (4.2); housing and energy (19.7);
furnishings, household equipment and routine household maintenance (4.6);
health (14.3); transport (11.0); communication (2.8); recreation
and culture (10.9); education (0.9); restaurants and hotels (9.8);
miscellaneous (10.2)

GER

1991:M1-2009:M2
{1992:M10}

Federal Statistical
Oﬃce Germany

[12] food and non-alcoholic beverages (10.4); alcoholic beverages and
tobacco (3.9); clothing and footwear (4.9); housing, water, electricity, gas
and other fuels (30.8); furnishings and household equipment (5.6);
health (4.0); transport (13.2); communication (3.1); recreation and
culture (11.6); education (0.7); restaurants and hotels (4.4); miscellaneous
goods and services (7.4)

H.K.

1984:M1-2009:M2
{1997:M3}

Census and Statistics
Department

[9] food (26.9); housing (29.2); electricity, gas, and water (3.6); alcoholic
drink and tobacco (0.9); clothing and footwear (5.9); durable goods (5.5);
miscellaneous goods (4.8); transport (9.1); miscellaneous services (16.2)

ITA

1984:M1-2009:M2
{1995:M11}

National institute of
Statistics

[8] food, beverages, and tobacco (21.8); clothing and footwear (9.7);
housing, water, electricity, gas and other fuels (11.0); furnishings and
household equipment (9.7); health (9.0); transport and communication
(20.2); education, recreation, and culture (9.8); miscellaneous (9.0)

JPN

1984:M1-2009:M2
{1993:M8}

Statistics Bureau

[10] food (24.6); housing (26.3); fuel, light, and water charge (5.8);
furniture and household utensils (2.9); clothes and footwear (4.9);
medical care (4.1); transportation and communication (10.2);
education (4.7); reading and recreation (11.1); miscellaneous (5.5)

TUR

1986:M1-2009:M2
{2002:M3}

Central Bank of the
Republic of Turkey
(CBRT)

[5] foodstuﬀs (36.6); heating and lighting articles (9.8); clothing and
house furniture (9.4); house rent and maintenance (11.7); miscellaneous
(36.4)

U.S.

1984:M1-2009:M2
{1999:M9}

Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS)

[6] apparel (4.2); food (17.9); other (3.8); housing (49.4); medical (7.3);
transportation (17.4)

Note: Dates in { } refer to the IT adoption date for targeters and the break point of the inflation series estimated by the
Bai-Perron (1998) method for nontargeters. The numbers in brackets represent the number of subaggregates and the entries
inside the parenthesis denote the weight of each subaggregate.
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